Is Devlet Bahçeli Saying “Set İmamoğlu Free”? Türköne Thinks So — And Probably He Couldn't Be More Wrong! But Why Is He Carrying Out This Propaganda With Strange Allies?
While most were confused by Bahçeli’s vague statement about imprisoned Presidental Candidate and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Türköne came right out and said it: “He’s saying, let him go.”
Professor Mümtaz’er Türköne is no ordinary political commentator. He’s one of the most controversial figures in modern Turkish political history — a former nationalist firebrand, ex-AKP insider, a onetime Gülen-aligned columnist, and a man who spent years in prison before being released in a twist that even “House of Cards” would struggle to script.
Recently, Türköne has taken on a new role: the unlikely “Bahçeli Decoder.” For the past few months, he’s been decoding the cryptic, often borderline-mystical messages of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli — President Erdoğan’s coalition partner and one of the most influential (and enigmatic) figures in Turkish politics.
After Bahçeli’s mysterious months-long absence following major surgery in early February — during which wild rumors circulated, including that he had died and the news was kept secret for the sake of the “Kurdish Initiative 2.0” — his return to the public eye was sudden and… cryptic, as usual. But Türköne cut through the noise — at least for a moment. While most were confused by Bahçeli’s vague statement about imprisoned Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Türköne came right out and said it: “He’s saying, let him go.”
And he didn’t stop there.
In a bold April 17 column, Türköne sketched out a near-future scenario that reads like political fan fiction — or, depending on your perspective, an eerily plausible forecast: Erdoğan is out, the CHP is in, early elections are called, and Turkey returns to a parliamentary system.
Türköne’s sudden entry into the political debate — through a series of interviews and YouTube appearances — has stirred the pot big time. Left-leaning and pro-Kurdish commentators like Medyascope's Ruşen Çakır see his words as signs of an impending political realignment. Others, like younger, more academically grounded analysts (such as Political Scientist Berk Esen), are rolling their eyes, calling Türköne’s predictions “wishful thinking” tailored to fit a Kurdish political agenda.
Whatever the truth, one thing’s for sure: Türköne has an agenda, and it most likely isn't serving the opposition's political struggle — even if that's how it’s presented.
At the first opportunity, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli lashed out at those keeping early election rumors alive, branding them as “rotten” and angrily rejecting the claims. I’ll be covering Bahçeli’s remarks — along with Berk Esen’s and Ruşen Çakır’s takes on the issue — in a separate piece soon.
What follows are key excerpts from his April 21, 2025 interview with journalist Cansu Çamlıbel — an interview that’s still echoing across Turkey’s political landscape.
Mümtaz’er Türköne: Erdoğan will undermine the peace process, Bahçeli will call early elections – because without a return to rule of law, this process has no chance
"The peace process is about building a new nation-state uniting Turks and Kurds"
Turkey’s just been through a tense month. After the March 19 raid on İmamoğlu’s team and the public backlash, the political balance didn’t collapse, but it definitely shook. During those key days, Bahçeli was still recovering from illness and hadn’t been seen. His first public message came on April 4. Then, on April 14, he posted a statement on X calling for a quick resolution to İmamoğlu’s court case. A few days later, he said, “Appointing a trustee to CHP is both wrong and impossible.” These messages seemed directed at his political ally, President Erdoğan — right?
For Bahçeli, the core issue right now is the peace process. He strongly supports it and opposes anything that might disrupt it. If we start there, everything else falls into place. Bahçeli is pushing a project where Turks and Kurds are one nation. And I believe that’s exactly what the peace process is — building a shared national identity.
One nation?
Yes. It’s about reconstructing the idea of a unified nation-state — not erasing Kurdish identity, but recognizing it within a shared national framework. Turks acknowledging Kurds as Kurds, and Kurds existing equally as part of the state.
***
“But none of this can work without law and rights”
Mümtazer Türköne: What matters most now is how much this new republic will respect fundamental rights. Kurds are a numerical minority — they can’t rule alone, but they can be part of a coalition. In that kind of system, their only guarantee is a state that respects the constitution, law, and human rights. That’s what needs to be built — a legal foundation that allows Turks and Kurds to truly share the state.
This is about redefining the nation itself — and Bahçeli is unwavering in this.
“Turkey's transition to a new state system: Full respect for the constitution”
So Bahçeli is the lead figure in this project, but whose project is it really?
The architect of this is undoubtedly Bahçeli, but it’s clear that this is not a project solely carried out by him. There is a “mindset (editor`s note: he refers “deep state”) behind this, one that has drawn this conclusion from the objective conditions in the region”. An initiative is at play, and Bahçeli supports it wholeheartedly. On the other side of this project, there is Abdullah Öcalan, who serves the same goal. In other words, this project is not a one-sided effort. Öcalan's statement on the 27th also confirms this. Turkey, like all modern nation-states around the world, is transitioning into a state system where the constitution is fully respected, the principle of separation of powers is upheld, the judiciary is independent, fundamental human rights are guaranteed, and cooperation, compromise, and collaboration based on law are realized. This also represents a historic opportunity for the Middle East. What is happening in Syria was also meant to bring about this outcome.
***
“This isn’t a threat—it’s a historic opportunity”
So what made Bahçeli — who once stood for the exact opposite — embrace this kind of Öcalan-linked peace process?
It’s an opportunity. What we are witnessing today in the Middle East is a historic opportunity, and the conditions that have created this opportunity are actually the objective circumstances of the Kurds. We’re not just talking about the situation of Turkish Kurds. Excluding Iran, we are referring to the objective conditions of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The Kurds must make a decision about their own fate. There are two possible alternatives. The first is the option where Israel’s security is ensured through a constant state of chaos and disorder. This was the reason Netanyahu supported the war in Syria for 13 years. The second option for the Kurds is a cosmos, a system. The fundamental and irreplaceable foundation of this system is the alliance between Kurds and Turks. In this decision of fate, the Kurds need to have a Turkey they can trust as a counterpart. In return, Turkey must convince the Kurds on all the issues they’ve complained about until now, and guarantee the principle of "honorable and equal citizens" under the rule of law. This means Turkey needs to come up with a solution that keeps all Kurds within its sphere of influence and sympathy. There’s a crucial factor that has brought us to this point: Iran is no longer a significant player in the region. Iran is in a disastrous state, effectively out of the game. Hakan Fidan himself mentioned this when referring to those with influence in Syria, saying there were "two and a half states." He referred to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
“The real partners in this new Middle East order are the U.S., UK, France — and Turkey”
So, you’re saying the fate of Syria — and by extension the Kurds — is now in the hands of Turkey, the U.S., UK, and France?
A system has been established in the Middle East, which includes Turkey, and where Israel is directly under the protection or supervision of the United States. The cornerstone of this system is, once again, the alliance between Turks and Kurds. Among these countries, I place more importance on the United Kingdom.
***
“Turkey’s external actions and internal rhetoric don’t match”
Day and night, the public is bombarded by government rhetoric about “foreign powers” or how anyone who’s not “one of us” is just a puppet of imperialism. But based on what you're saying, neither Devlet Bahçeli nor the ruling coalition sees any problem with partnering with imperial powers in shaping a new Middle East. So, doesn’t that confirm there's a deep contradiction between what the ruling bloc tells the Turkish people and what they’re actually doing?
Well, if we separate two things, the contradiction becomes less confusing. We need to distinguish between Turkey’s actions in the Middle East and abroad, and the rhetoric used domestically around those actions—because the two don't align. And frankly, the rhetoric isn’t really grounded in facts. It’s aimed more at influencing public perception, persuading voters, and navigating party politics. But when it comes to actual policy and actions, there’s not even the slightest ambiguity.
“If Erdoğan gives up his hegemonic power, he ceases to exist—but even then, Bahçeli wouldn’t support him under a dictatorship-style alternative.”
Now let’s circle back to the beginning of this conversation and my initial question about Bahçeli’s stance on the İmamoğlu operation. Since you responded with a deep analysis of the ‘peace process,’ here’s how I interpret it: You’re essentially saying, “Bahçeli’s only real concern is the ‘terror-free Turkey’ project, and he won’t tolerate anything that might derail it.” So, does that mean he views the March 19 operation purely through the lens of whether it threatens his project?
Can we say that Bahçeli has a broader strategic vision? Erdoğan is faced with two options. The first is to continue wielding power as he does now—maintaining hegemonic control, including over the judiciary, and ruling the country as a dominant force. The second is to return to the rule of law, reinforce the constitutional order within the framework of universal legal norms, and move toward a resolution of the peace process on that foundation. And if Erdoğan chooses that second path, then the accusations of autocracy and dictatorship effectively disappear.
So why not choose the second option?
Because if he drops the authoritarian tools — the fear, the pressure — he risks losing everything. He has no economic success, no strong public support. Without control, he fades away. But here’s the problem: Bahçeli won’t support an increasingly dictatorial Erdoğan. The only path Bahçeli can back is the one based on law and the peace process. That’s Erdoğan’s paradox.
“Without rule of law, the peace process can’t succeed — Bahçeli knows this”
So you're saying a lawless system can’t support this “terror-free Turkey” project?
Exactly. That’s simply not possible. In fact, if you recall the most recent article by Bahçeli published in “Türkgün”, he specifically emphasized the importance of law, the constitution, freedoms, and fundamental rights. Bahçeli is fully aware of this—he understands it, and he’s taken a clear stance on it. When he holds power, when he’s part of the ruling coalition, he wouldn’t make such strong statements lightly. As a political actor focused on the peace process—someone who treats it like the fixed point of a compass and draws circles around it—he emphasizes the rule of law because nothing else can carry that process forward. Without it, the entire effort collapses. You can’t get anyone to follow you without legal guarantees.
And look, both you and I are saddened by Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s illness—may he recover soon. As you know, he was one of the people who took real risks during the 2013–2015 peace process, and he paid a price for it. We remember what he went through. When there’s no rule of law, no legal protection, anyone who steps up to take responsibility for this kind of effort today will also end up in trouble.
“Law is no longer just a legal issue — it’s a matter of survival for Turkey”
And everyone knows that. DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan told me, “If this fails, we’ll be blamed again.”
They all know this. The only real guarantee is the rule of law. At this point, maintaining a functioning legal system has become a matter of national survival for Turkey. A new national consciousness is going to be built—that’s the perspective from the state side, and it’s also the perspective represented by Devlet Bahçeli. A new national identity, a new republic is on the horizon. And this time, it’s going to be shaped as a true partnership—one that, 100 years later, the Kurds can genuinely feel satisfied with, can accept, and give their full consent to. The details of this new framework could include just about anything you can imagine. Although Öcalan has even moved away from culturalist policies at this point, anything is on the table. And in the end, everyone stands to gain—Kurds, Turks, Turkey as a whole, and all Kurds across the region.
“Bahçeli is saying, ‘End the İmamoğlu case now’”
So going back to İmamoğlu — when Bahçeli said, “If he’s innocent, clear him; if guilty, punish him quickly,” what did he really mean?
He meant: “End this now.”
But some people on TV said that court cases in Turkey take years, and Bahçeli just meant “speed it up.”
No, Bahçeli was being very clear. He sees this as a political case and wants it resolved politically — now. His message was crystal clear.
So he’s saying, “Free Ekrem İmamoğlu and close the case”?
I'm interpreting it this clearly—because as long as Ekrem İmamoğlu is not allowed to continue freely, as long as he is stripped of his freedom through these politically motivated trials, the peace process simply can't move forward. Let me remind you: there were two legal cases against İmamoğlu. One involved a “terror” charge based on the urban consensus initiative, and the other is the one we’re dealing with now. They couldn’t follow through on the terrorism charge tied to that urban consensus. If they had, we all know what would’ve happened—trustees would have been appointed to take over the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.
“Prosecuting İmamoğlu over the urban consensus would’ve destroyed the peace process.”
There’s a lot of talk in political circles that the operation was originally planned exactly like that—from the beginning, the goal was to appoint trustees both to the municipality and to the CHP. In fact, CHP Chair Özgür Özel and other party officials have made statements that confirm those rumors.
That was probably the plan. But pursuing that route would’ve jeopardized the peace process even more than imprisoning İmamoğlu—it could’ve completely derailed it. What is the “urban consensus,” after all? It’s simply two political parties, operating under the Political Parties Law, reaching an agreement and entering an election together. If you start labeling that as terrorism, how can you ever expect the peace process to succeed?
“Bahçeli doesn’t have direct contact with Erdoğan—he sends his messages through the media and that’s how he hits the brakes.”
At that point, there were rumors that some senior figures within the AKP stepped in and managed to convince President Erdoğan, at the last minute, not to go through with it. Bahçeli wasn’t very vocal around that time either. Since this move would’ve directly impacted the ‘terror-free Turkey’ project, could it be that Bahçeli stepped in and had some sort of exchange with Erdoğan?
I don’t believe Bahçeli has any direct line of communication with Erdoğan—neither through intermediaries nor via phone calls.
… There’s never been direct communication between them. They speak to each other through the media. You won’t find a single sign, not even a hint, in Bahçeli’s statements suggesting that they talk behind closed doors or reach any private agreements. All of Bahçeli’s messages are delivered publicly—through speeches or written statements—and that’s how he applies pressure or pulls the brakes when needed.
“Erdoğan’s response to the October 22 move was appointing a trustee instead of recognizing Ahmet Türk”
Since you're saying there isn’t the kind of communication line between Erdoğan and Bahçeli that most people assume, let’s rewind a bit to the early days of this Öcalan initiative. Back when everyone was still asking, “What is this all about?”, you were one of the few who confidently said, “A new peace process has begun.” Do you think this was something launched with full coordination between Erdoğan and Bahçeli? Or was it, as some people close to the government have claimed, something Erdoğan didn’t even know about at first?
You can tell what really happened by looking at how Erdoğan responded. In return, he appointed a trustee to replace Ahmet Türk as mayor of Mardin. I’m convinced of this. Cansu, I don’t have any inside information or anything someone whispered to me behind the scenes. But I’m making this judgment based on the messages that were sent and the way events unfolded.
“Up until now, every step taken in the peace process has been a result of Bahçeli’s insistence, while Erdoğan has been stalling the plan.”
Do you think Bahçeli had no idea that Erdoğan would approve the pre-dawn raid on İmamoğlu and that İmamoğlu would be arrested?
I don’t think he knew that İmamoğlu would be arrested. However, I believe Bahçeli probably played a role in ensuring that İmamoğlu wasn’t arrested in the a terrorism investigation. Whether directly or indirectly... If someone is detained under such an investigation, it means they are being taken in for possible arrest on terrorism charges. Someone must have intervened to stop it later on. And the only person who could have done that is Bahçeli. To return to the main point, I believe the peace process was established before Erdoğan ever developed any perspective on the issue, and in fact, Erdoğan has never been particularly warm towards the peace process. Every step we’ve reached so far is the result of Bahçeli’s persistence.
Do you still think Erdoğan isn’t on board? After Öcalan’s February 27 statement, he seemed more supportive. And just ten days ago, he finally met with the DEM Party delegation.
He’s still not on board. He knows this process could lead to his political end. I said it early on: “This peace process will bring down Erdoğan. A real democratic shift won’t let a government like his survive.” Erdoğan had a plan to manage and drag out the process—he thought he could stall it indefinitely. But Bahçeli saw right through him. Bahçeli’s October 22 proposal (bringing Öcalan to Parliament to speak to his followers) was actually a move against Erdoğan. Erdoğan responded with trustee appointments, targeting people like Ahmet Türk. Now, everyone’s wondering whether what’s said in public matches what’s really going on. Here’s the thing—if someone suddenly says, “Cumhur Ittifaki (Erdogan-Bahceli Alliance) is going strong,” that’s a sign of problems within the state.
But both Erdoğan and Bahçeli have said that exact thing many times.
Exactly. Which means they’re both signaling that there are some problems.
“After I got out of prison, I went to thank Devlet Bahçeli”
How can you speak so confidently, even though you say you don’t have inside info and haven’t seen Bahçeli in four years? That last meeting was right after you were released from prison thanks to his intervention, right?**
Yes. I visited Bahçeli at the MHP headquarters about a week after I got out to thank him. We talked for nearly an hour. I was jailed because I opposed the AKP, yet I was labeled a “FETÖ supporter.” Bahçeli knew that I was in prison because I opposed the government—not because of any ties to that group. I stayed inside two and a half years longer than others who were arrested for the same reasons—people like Mehmet Altan, Şahin Alpay, Ali Bulaç, and Ahmet Turan Alkan were released earlier.
So you think you stayed longer because you were seen as a stronger dissenter?
Exactly. In court, when the judge asked if I felt remorse, I said, “Let me save you the trouble. I feel no remorse because I committed no crime.” I wrote all this in my book “Silivri Postası”. We were jailed on orders—it was obvious who would be released quickly. One of them was İhsan Dağı, for example.
Then, you’re saying Bahçeli supported you because he knew the truth—and you thanked him in 2021. But no contact since?
No contact for four years.
***
“If Bahçeli had an issue with what I write, I would’ve heard about it”
Even though you don’t talk to MHP or get any inside scoop, you keep interpreting Bahçeli’s moves—often making bold claims. How can you be so sure?
If he had a problem with it, I’d know. I was a militant nationalist in the '70s—president of the Ülkü Ocakları at university, later worked in the MHP headquarters. I even went to jail during the post-1980 coup trials. I know the core ideology well. I understand how they think. I also know Bahçeli personally—he’s an extremely polite and discreet person. You can never really know what he’s thinking. Even today, he’s misunderstood. But make no mistake—Bahçeli isn’t playing politics; he’s thinking about history. He wants to be remembered as one of the architects of a renewed republic and nation-state. His actions have nothing to do with short-term political gain.
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“Erdoğan will stall the process, Bahçeli will push for snap elections, because no real solution is possible without a return to the rule of law”
Let’s summarize: You say Bahçeli’s focused on rebuilding the nation-state, sometimes publicly nudging Erdoğan. Erdoğan refuses to let go of his authoritarian grip, which means this peace process could end his rule. And you believe early elections are coming this year. Plus, a return to a parliamentary system is part of the plan. But why would Erdoğan agree to any of this?
Here’s how I see it: Erdoğan will block the peace process because he believes returning to the rule of law would weaken his power and put him at risk. So, he’ll undermine the process bit by bit. But the process can’t succeed without a legal framework. That’s when Bahçeli will push for snap elections. Only then can the process move forward.
***
“If Erdoğan tries to bring back parliamentary rule, Bahçeli will stop him”
Would the release of Ekrem İmamoğlu be a sign that Erdoğan is leaning toward a legal reset?
He might let him go, but that alone won’t be enough. He doesn’t have the political will to fully guarantee legal protections for a peace process. And if Erdoğan does consider returning to a parliamentary system, Bahçeli will block it. He always says the presidential system is the best choice—because it keeps MHP politically relevant. In a parliamentary system, MHP loses its influence.
***
“If CHP wins the next possibly snap elections, rule of law follows—and so does peace”
You wrote a piece imagining the headlines in April 2026, where there’s been an election, the CHP is in power, and talks of returning to parliamentary rule are underway. In your scenario, how can Bahçeli trust that a CHP president would handle the peace process right?
If Bahçeli backs early elections and tries to block a return to parliamentary rule, it won’t be to protect power—it’ll be to protect the peace process. If CHP wins, the rule of law will naturally follow, which will support the peace process. The one thing Bahçeli cares about above all else is that the process succeeds. If helping that means stepping aside, he’ll do it.
In fact, neither CHP leader Özgür Özel nor Ekrem İmamoğlu has outright opposed the process from the beginning. Just the other day, Özel said at the gates of Silivri Prison: “The vision capable of building a terror-free Turkey, of fully resolving the Kurdish issue, of making all Kurds equal citizens, of making them feel like this state belongs to them—that vision is here. And the presidential candidate of that vision is currently behind bars.”
But they woke up to it far too late. And even now, they’re not fully convinced. I think the group least to be trusted when it comes to the peace process in Turkey is the ultranationalists.1 Take the İYİ Party, for example—they're trying to stir up nationalist sentiment, but it’s not really landing. These days, opposition to the peace process doesn’t hold much real weight.2
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“The economy would immediately improve if early elections were announced”
So in short, Erdoğan still wants to run again, but you believe he’ll agree to snap elections before 2027.
He has no choice. Look at the economy—we didn’t go into detail today, but it’s the real driver of politics. Announce early elections, and the economy will immediately calm down. CDS scores will drop, interest rates will fall, and hope will return, which itself can ease inflation. This government has become a massive burden on the economy, and that’s what will make early elections necessary.
“Even if İmamoğlu isn’t allowed to run, he’ll remain CHP’s real leader”
And you believe the peace process will lead to İmamoğlu’s release.
It has to. You can’t run a democratic peace process while keeping someone like İmamoğlu, a major presidential candidate, in prison.
But he’s not just jailed—his diploma was revoked. He’d need more than just release to be eligible.
Remember how Erdoğan entered Parliament back in 2003... I believe we're now at a point where even if the CHP put up an empty chair as a candidate, it could win. So, with İmamoğlu, even if there's a placeholder candidacy or a new figure introduced as part of a roadmap back to the parliamentary system—some sort of workaround will definitely be found. Still, İmamoğlu will remain the true leader of the Republican People's Party. He may not become president in the first stage, but he’ll continue to be seen as the real figure at the helm.
Editor’s Note: It’s striking that Mümtazer Türköne, rooted in the core of the Ülkücü movement, labels the İYİ Party as “ultranationalist.” This mirrors a broader habit in certain liberal-left, pro-Kurdish, identity-focused lefty political circles in Turkey, where those outside their ideological line are quite often branded as Nazis or ultranationalists. The İYİ Party, a secular-nationalist offshoot that split from the MHP during its shift toward a government alliance, appeals to a younger, more educated electorate—many of whom shifted their votes to the CHP after the 2023 general elections. Given the MHP’s long history of links to unsolved political violence and mafia ties, it’s analytically questionable and politically revealing for Türköne to cast İYİ as the radical right. This may signal a new phase, where critics of the growing Kurdish-Islamist and Turkish-Islamist alignment are the ones recast as “ultranationalists.”
Editor’s Note: Despite high-level political maneuvering, public support for what some have dubbed “Kurdish Initiative 2.0” remains limited. Even among AKP and MHP voters, skepticism runs deep, and the broader public sentiment appears largely unconvinced.